Concern about the unsustainable harvesting practices of fish has arisen, in great part, because of dramatic collapses of several individual stocks (Hutchings 2000). Whereas fish were once thought to be an endless resource in a vast ocean, they have now become part of an increasingly endangered and imbalanced ecosystem: “At least 60% of the world’s 200 most commercially valuable species are over-fished or fished to the limit” (Williams 1998).
While some fish species are able to recover from the effects of fishing pressure rather quickly, others produce young with long developmental stages, complex migration patterns, and/or long ages to maturity, all of which decrease the ability of these species to recover adequately from current fishing practices. A gradual shift from long-lived, high trophic level fish to low-trophic-level invertebrates and plankton-feeding fish has created impoverished, less valuable ecosystems. Over-fishing in one location can affect the stocks of fish across a wide range of locations by altering food web structures (Williams 1998).
Of the three resources we are examining, fisheries are arguably the easiest to measure. However, measuring fisheries is complicated by the fact that they can be measured in several ways, including population counts, reproductive capacity, productivity, catch, landings, and market value. Also, fisheries are frequently measured in economic terms, even in discussions relating to ecological sustainability.
Many towns, cities and countries base their cultural identities and livelihoods on fishing and fisheries. However, economic and environmental issues often overshadow cultural value. Lack of reliable information and inadequate transfer of information is a pervasive problem in fisheries management. Ecologists have warned governments about the disastrous impacts of fishing practices, but have either not been heard or have been too ambiguous in their conclusions to significantly influence policy makers (Masood 1997). Also, there have been systematic distortions in reported world fisheries catch trends; in most cases, catches are underreported, while in China they were inflated to give the impression of production increases (Watson and Pauly 2001). Finally, consumers are often unaware of the unsustainability of many fisheries and continue to demand over-fished and declining species (McCosker 2002).
The primary property regime structure applied to the world’s fisheries is an open access scheme. The high seas are open to all comers; anyone with a net or fishing line can freely harvest these areas. This has been commonly accepted global law since first written in 1609 by Hugo Grotius. This law excluded only those areas that fell under the category of coastal territorial waters, which eventually came to be recognized as three nautical miles from shore. The establishment of exclusive economic zones in the 1970s extended the area over which any one state had exclusive economic rights to 200 nautical miles (Weber 1994). Fisheries, of course, were included in the economic exclusivity. Because the vast majority of fishing is concentrated in the rich coastal waters, states became the managing entities of most of the world’s fisheries. However, fisheries remained a common property regime because they continued to be open to all members of a particular nation’s fishing fleet.
There are exceptions to this national/open access regime. For example, local communities are the sole owners of much of Japan’s fisheries resources. (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). The fish are common property of each village, which then allocates those resources among the residents through formally organized councils. Another trend in various locations is the allocation of quotas that in effect re-define national fish stocks as private property.
International management and regulation of fisheries is glaringly absent. Because of the open access policies of international waters, there is no structure for resource management and allocation in such groups as the United Nations. Some ad hoc organizations concerned with a single species have developed, such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, but there is currently no overarching international fisheries management group. NGOs are another socio-political unit that has minimal influence over the structure of fisheries management. While NGOs have been active in promoting marine mammal conservation and influencing consumer seafood choice, they have not made a substantial contribution to the ongoing debate over fisheries management.
While there are many variations in management regimes of fisheries, the prevailing structure of resource exploitation has centered on some form of open access. With recent evidence of collapsing fisheries stocks, however, a trend towards different management schemes is emerging. Technological changes in fishing methods and human population growth have combined to threaten open access regimes as viable options on both local and global scales.
There are several avenues that may lead us to a more sustainable fisheries industry. Each of these avenues approaches the problem from a different angle and thus attempts to ameliorate a distinct aspect of the crisis. Understanding how each of these approaches potentially supports or impedes the industry is the primary step in achieving effective long-term fisheries maintenance.
Perhaps the most basic solution to over-fishing is the quota system. A quota is an economically driven policy that limits overall catch for species of concern in order to simultaneously ensure survival of targeted species and the fishing industry. Unfortunately, quotas are not as simple as they seem. They may encourage short periods of intense fishing (often referred to as the “race for the fish”), which can increase by-catch (Dewees 1998). Furthermore, quotas sometimes rely on ambiguous data and indirectly lead to the exploitation of non-quota species. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) is a potential solution that attempts to address these issues by assigning yearly tradeable catch quotas to individual fishers. This reduces the “race for the fish”; yet, ITQs are still susceptible to vague or even erroneous data. Improving communication between scientists and managers, as well as targeting research towards resolving the ambiguities surrounding quotas, can improve the effectiveness of this solution.
Long-term protective solutions include establishing local cooperatives and designating marine reserves. While local cooperatives may come the closest to addressing the root cause of overexploitation by promoting stakeholder dialogue that can produce economically and ecologically viable local management schemes, marine reserves can address the problem more immediately. Local cooperatives are driven by small-scale economics and are based on the assumption that regional inhabitants have a sound, multi-dimensional comprehension of the resource. Marine reserves are easier to enforce than other management approaches and provide members of the local area with an opportunity to learn about and therefore appreciate unspoiled waters. However, unless designated in conjunction with other protected areas, marine reserves can be ineffective in the protection of migratory species.
Aquaculture is a production system that draws heavily on technological innovation. Fish farming attempts to meet the consumption demands of society, reduce the effort required to fish, and relieve pressure on natural aquatic systems. While theoretically sound, the drawbacks to this approach may actually hinder rather than sustain the industry over time. Large scale operations, in particular, contribute to habitat loss, degradation of agricultural land, depletion of fish populations typically used for feed, and expedite the spread of disease and genetic mixing in wild populations due to the sporadic escape of farm-raised fish.
Finally, attempts to regulate fishing equipment, timing and seasonality, as well as overall size of fishing fleets, are an extension of the quota idea to other aspects of the fishing industry. Changes in equipment are often a result of technological innovations. This approach to management can be easier to enforce than direct quotas involving particular species of fish; yet such regulation may have negative economic consequences for small-scale fishing operations. A limit on overall fleet size protects the small-scale fisher; regulations concerning timing and seasonality affect fishing at all levels. Both of these approaches are socially motivated processes that attempt to sustain the resource by distributing access equally amid immediate stakeholders.
It
is clear that there is no easy way to establish sustainable fisheries. Every potential solution generates a
commensurate dilemma. Successful
approaches to sustaining fish as a global resource will need to dynamically and
adaptively combine various facets of several approaches.